Mike Hopkins has more experience than most principals of overseeing college mergers. In January of this year South and City College Birmingham, which he heads, received its second successive grade 2 Ofsted, despite having absorbed two failing colleges in the past seven years. FE Week asked how they managed it
In 2012, before area reviews were even a twinkle in the FE commissioner’s eye (in fact before the role of commissioner was established), South Birmingham College found out that its neighbour, City College Birmingham, was in dire financial straits.
“It wasn’t until they’d exhausted pretty much everything, that they then had a conversation with us,” says Mike Hopkins, then the South Birmingham College principal.
The two colleges shared a campus and had worked closely over the years, so their fates were already intertwined.
We had to absorb everything in terms of the financial impact
“What we couldn’t be in a position for at that time was to have a competitor take over a college that was on our campus,” Hopkins says, leaning back in his chair at the Bournville campus of what is now South and City College Birmingham, a 25,000-learner general FE college spread over eight campuses across the south and centre of the city.
South Birmingham stepped in, taking over City College “with no support from the government. We had to absorb everything in terms of the financial impact,” Hopkins says. The college went from financial good health to taking on millions in debt, some of which is still being paid off.
But it wasn’t just the finances that left it to sink or swim. “To be honest at the point at which we signed all the documents, all the various agencies said, ‘Oh, thank you very much’, and we didn’t hear from them again. We were on speed dial until then, and they just disappeared.”
It took three years of slog to get systems integrated, staff aligned, and the finances back on an even keel. They told tutors to forget about the finance and focus on the students, but behind the scenes the admin team was working frantically to stay afloat. Hopkins describes the period as being like a “swan going across the water, you don’t see the legs going mad”.
The transaction unit was bureaucracy gone mad
By 2015 the college managed a grade 2 across the board in its Ofsted inspection, which said that “leaders have been successful in raising the overall success rates following a decline brought about by the merger three years ago”.
But just as things were starting to feel settled, it was hit with £15 million in austerity cuts to its adult education budget and the area review process began, in which the FE Commissioner was tasked with assessing provision in each part of the country and recommending potential mergers. Birmingham was one of the first to come under scrutiny and Hopkins recalls that “the commissioner came in with a clear view of what he wanted, which was a merger of us, Birmingham Met because it was in trouble, and Bournville College”.
Birmingham Metropolitan College, a 30,000-learner, seven-campus giant with a grade 3 Ofsted rating, had already received £4.5 million in exceptional financial support in the previous 12 months and had its financial management branded “not acceptable” by David Collins, then the FE commissioner.
Bournville, a medium-sized college on the site of the former Rover factory in Longbridge, was also in financial dire straits. “We knew that no college could take on Bournville’s debts,” Hopkins says.
A civil engineering student operates a theodolite at the construction facility at Bordesley Green
He was clear that taking on both, to form the largest college in the country, “wasn’t doable without potentially collapsing everything”. He refused.
But there was a local issue that the college governors and executive felt a responsibility to help with. Bournville College was relocated in 2011 from its University of Birmingham home to a purpose-built campus on the former Rover site as part of the government’s strategy to redevelop the area after Rover MG went into administration in 2005, leaving 6,000 people without jobs.
South and City offered to enter conversations about a deal to take over Bournville – as long the government would cover the debt. But the way Hopkins describes the discussions, as soon as it hinted it would be prepared to consider the merger, the “floodgates” opened.
This was a time when everything was in flux. “The insolvency regime was on the horizon,” he recalls, “so the banks had changed their standpoint completely, the pension fund was jumping around all over the place because of the insolvency regime and were saying, well, colleges are now a massive risk. Then they brought in something called the transaction unit, which was bureaucracy gone mad.”
The transaction unit is a team in the Education, Skills and Funding Agency tasked with allocating funds for mergers arising from the area reviews – from the “restructuring facility” fund of £726 million.
South and City received some financial support from this fund (the amount is confidential), but it was still lumped with a £15 million mortgage and at least £5 million in bank loans with “stupidly high interest rates” and penalty clauses preventing it from paying them off early.
The 2017-18 accounts show bank loans of £26 million, plus £3.6 million owed to the ESFA. The college is currently trying to sell properties to allow it to restructure its debt, Hopkins says, which will take at least ten years to pay off.
“Bluntly, the government got it wrong. We were one of the first two through and it told us it couldn’t get rid of bank debts, so we inherited bank debts. It subsequently got rid of bank debts in other colleges. That would have put us in a far stronger position.
“What we could do with is the transaction unit coming back in reviewing what it did and then addressing it and saying actually, we’ll inject some more to get rid of at least one of the bank loans.”
The restructuring facility fund, however, closed last year with £256 million still left unspent.
In the meantime, the senior team at South and City is keen to push the narrative that students are entirely protected from the impact – and Ofsted awarded its provision another solid grade 2 in January of this year. When pressed, however, Hopkins admits that as well as freezing staff pay, it has had to slash support services such as mentors and mental health workers. “Having those sort of key people to work in community with families and with the students, that’s the bit that’s gone out the window.”
Hopkins’ £180,000 salary for an institution with a turnover of £78 million seems relatively modest when benchmarked against others in the sector. Last year 73 principals were paid more than £150,000 and the highest paid, Matt Hamnett, the former principal of North Hertfordshire College, received £294,000 for a college with a turnover of £30 million.
For someone who’s taken a massive institution through the fire, twice, Hopkins comes over as remarkably stoical – something he attributes to the “excessive amounts of exercise” he does as a racing cyclist. My questions about work-life balance don’t seem to compute. “I live and breathe this,” he insists. “I get a real buzz out of what I do and what we achieve. I love it and I haven’t run out of energy yet, I haven’t stopped enjoying what I do, and I mean even with all the downsides.”
His management style is to be relentlessly present. “A lot of the staff at Bournville think I spend most of my time here. If you ask the people at Digbeth [another of the eight campuses], they’ll say the same thing.”
The key to a successful merger, he insists, is creating an open culture. One of the first things he did at Bournville was to move the senior managers down from their fifth-floor “glass tower” to the first floor and institute an open-door policy, with doors literally propped open unless a meeting is going on. “I accept it might be disruptive, but the other thing is, you’re available to students.”
He runs a “principal’s question time” once a term at seven of the campuses, which has created a culture where the students feel they can chat to him at any time.
A “relentless attention to behaviour” was another crucial part of the Bournville turnaround, he insists, telling how he’s recently witnessed cleaning staff pick up students for wearing a hoodie or dropping litter. The posters on the walls “give them a sort of back-up” – and the catering, security and cleaning staff feel more buy-in now that they are all employed in-house and paid the living wage.
It’s intriguing that Hopkins has agreed to meet me at all, given that he’s uninterested in making a name for himself, refusing invitations to speak at the Association of Colleges conference, for example.
I live and breathe this… I haven’t run out of energy yet
He was “dumbfounded” by how many principals approached him after he wrote a short piece in FE Week earlier this year, giving tips on how to manage a college merger – but says he didn’t have time to engage with the people who asked him for more advice.
“I’ll help colleges regionally, I will help and support, but I’m not going to spend lots of time and effort for things which I have no gain.
“I’m paid to run this college, so spending lots of time ingratiating myself with everybody on the national scene, well, how does that help the college? What benefit do the staff and students have if I’m somewhere else doing things which are not about the college?”
Key dates
August 2012
South Birmingham College merges with City College to become South and City College Birmingham
September 2015
Area reviews process begins, with Birmingham in the first wave
November 2015
South and City College Birmingham gets an Ofsted grade 2
February 2016
ESFA transaction unit created to administer financial support for mergers
August 2017
South and City College Birmingham merges with Bournville College
September 2018
The transaction unit’s restructuring facility closes with £256 million unspent
November 2018
South and City College Birmingham gets an Ofsted grade 2
Chris Cherry provides key insights that will avoid misunderstanding and poor practice
In the world of apprenticeship standards, the gateway is the door between the two core stages of the apprenticeship – the on-programme training and the end-point assessment. The apprentice passes through the gate when they have met minimum requirements and are performing consistently at (or above) the level of competence expected for that occupation.
At the gateway (the end of the training period), the employer in consultation with the training provider, unlatches the gate because they believe the apprentice is competent in the occupation and ready to demonstrate this during the end-point assessment.
But how do you really know when the apprentice is ready?
It’s a question we’ve been asked a lot, from our work with over 5,000 apprenticeship practitioners. So, here’s a few insights to get you thinking.
Let’s start with the mandatory gateway requirements
Mandatory requirements are different in each assessment plan. Here are a few common examples:
• achievement of level 1 English and mathematics and evidence of attempting a level 2 test
• achievement of a required qualification (particularly in regulated occupations)
• completion of a workplace portfolio
• a letter signed by the employer confirming readiness for assessment
• apprentice self-assessment.
It’s important that you are in close contact with the End-Point Assessment Organisation (EPAO) to make the gateway decision. Some training providers have wrongly assumed that the gateway is an opportunity to check with the EPAO whether the apprentice is ready for assessment. This is not the case, and you won’t be able to submit evidence to the EPAO to check in advance. This cuts across independence and opens the door for misunderstanding and poor practice. EPAOs are encouraged to provide guidance on how to manage the gateway.
In some assessment plans, there are tasks that the apprentice needs to complete during training, or during a gateway period, which then feed into final assessment. These could be a project, presentation or portfolio.
It’s worth remembering that the gateway is not the point where the employer feels the apprentice is guaranteed to pass, but where further training would not make the apprentice more assessment-ready. Holding back on readiness could have the reverse effect on performance. There are issues of timing and funding for the training provider that may influence the gateway, but in pure teaching and learning terms, assessment should quickly follow the completion of training when the apprentice is performing at (or above) the required standard of competence.
“OK,” you may say, “but what about the apprentice’s level of competence?”
As you reach the end of training, you will get – using your professional judgement – a sense that the apprentice is ready.
Training providers take different approaches with their employers, but here are four linked questions that many have found useful in discovering whether the apprentice is gateway-ready.
• Is there sufficient evidence that the apprentice is ready?
• Is there a body of work you can reference that shows the apprentice has consistently been working towards the standard and is familiar and comfortable with the assessment methods used at the end-point?
• Does that evidence show achievement of the elements?
• Are you confident there is evidence the apprentice has gained each knowledge, skill and behavioural element that could be assessed at the end-point?
• Is there a certainty that achievement is at the level required?
• Do you and the employer both feel that the apprentice is able to work in that occupation, at the necessary performance level? It’s important that apprentices aren’t just being “trained to the test”.
• Do you consider the apprentice to be competent?
Once you are certain the above criteria have been met, you should feel confident that the apprentice will be able to demonstrate that competency.
It is at this point that the employer will be required to confirm their apprentice is ready. The EPAO will then check the evidence and open the gate to the end-point assessment.
Apprenticeship funding rules require that we demonstrate our negotiations. Lucy Ottewell-Key outlines the core principles to consider
The new apprenticeship world can be confusing and unfamiliar to the education sector. Negotiate? How? What does it mean to be in a commercial and competitive market?
What indicators, funding rules, features, benefits and unique selling points support strong negotiation? How do you differentiate from another provider? Why would an employer pay more for your provision than someone else’s? Providers need to dive deep into strategies, training, processes and procedures to support business growth, while manoeuvring within complex funding rules and providing an outstanding service.
Not only do we need to negotiate, we need to prove we have done so.
Apprenticeship funding rules state that providers must collect evidence to prove negotiation to employers, ESFA, Ofsted and internal compliance teams.
Negotiation is an art rather than a science. Core principles to consider:
1. Be knowledgeable and prepare. You must understand and have detailed knowledge of apprenticeships, the funding and technical guidance. What is an apprenticeship? What are the roles and responsibilities of each party? What is your offer, your curriculum plan, how do you deliver it? What can be bespoke? What is standard? Does the employer understand off-the-job and EPA? Are your team prepared to “sell”? Have they had suitable training?
2. Determine your desired outcome before you start. Do your research.
Does your offer and curriculum meet their needs? How can you support the employer to navigate apprenticeships?
3. Build rapport. In many cases people buy from people, not companies, so building a rapport is the first step to sustainable relationships.
4. Understand your worth. You are a quality provider that offers outstanding apprenticeships and amazing customer service. Prove it, live it and shout about it!
5. Listen. You need to understand what that business needs from their apprenticeship programmes. Go for a tour, speak to staff!
6. Complete negotiations feeling it is a good deal for both sides.
Apprenticeships are about supporting individuals to progress into their chosen careers and reducing skills gaps.
Feel sure that you have made a positive impact on a business, which will, in turn, support an individual.
7. If you can’t, stay professional and walk away. If it does not fit with your ethos, maybe that business is not for you.
Why would an employer pay more for your provision than someone else’s?
One way in which apprenticeship negotiation differs from other products and services is that we have an added layer of negotiation: prior learning. The interesting point to note with prior learning adjustments is that until you have completed a recruitment process, you cannot confirm the price.
This process involves stages such as advice and guidance, initial assessments, checking prior qualifications and ensuring the employer and training provider feel the candidate is suitable for the apprenticeship. Providers may have a core pricing plan based on the quality of provision and the fundable elements of the programme, but until you have a potential individual, you are a little stuck.
Funding guidance states that all knowledge, skills and behaviours set out in the standard should be considered when reviewing prior learning.
How can you prove to an auditor or an inspector that you and the employer are confident that public money is not being used to fund knowledge, skills or behaviours that individual already has? Can the apprenticeship meet minimum requirements, such as duration or off-the-job?
In conclusion, apprenticeship price negotiation is a complex, two-stage process. First of all, why pick you when a number of other providers are knocking at the door? And secondly, can you, as a provider, ensure that the candidate is appropriate? The implications for not getting this right are pretty serious.
There is a theme across four stories in FE Week today which combined might suggest there is a critical business problem with funding rules and data requirements – complexity.
Let’s look at the stories in turn.
1.ESFA finds achievement rate data ‘unreliable’. Behind the scenes the ESFA audit teams continue to grapple with providers inflating achievement rates and funding claims by knowingly or unwittingly manipulating their Individualised Learner Record (ILR) data returns. The highly complex algorithm to calculate achievement rates using ‘hybrid ends years’ has required several changes, such as to the treatment of breaks in learning and transfers, in an attempt to close loopholes. But the situation has now got so bad that more than 30 apprenticeship providers have been singled out, and the UK Statistics Authority in looking into whether the headline achievement rates can be trusted.
2.Confusion over how to calculate and record off-the job minimum hours. In an effort to be helpful the ESFA put out guidance, nearly two years after implementation, which said to comply with the funding rules the off the job minimum hours should be based on a 30 hour week for all apprentices. A week later, after claiming this was not a change the rules, the ESFA apologised and withdrew the 30 hour section of the guidance. Trouble is, a quick glance at the dozens of comments on the ESFA message board, FE Connect, shows providers are still grappling with complex issues like the difference between paid and contract hours leaving them unsure if they actually comply with the off-the-job minimum hour calculation rules.
3.Devolution of AEB at risk of falling at first data hurdle. The GLA has revealed in papers going to their board next week that developing a contracting and payments system, to include collection of FE data, is at high risk of creating an overspend. The ESFA already operates a very expensive and complex funding system based on monthly ILR submissions, so we should perhaps not be surprised trying to recreate it from scratch is both difficult and also wasteful duplication.
4.Employer left bemused after Apprenticeship System wipes £300,000 from their account. After five months, the ESFA still could not explain or resolve what appears to be a significant problem with the Apprenticeship System. Within hours of FE Week asking for an explanation the money reappeared, but questions remain over how and why this can happen. And the ESFA has delayed access to the system for small employers indefinitely as it grapples with issues like how to simplify complex functionality as well as ration the funding between established and untested providers.
Performance information needs to be trustworthy, funding rules need to be clear enough to comply with and payment and contracting systems simply need to work.
There are no easy solutions, but if these cannot be achieved then the tougher intervention regimes for colleges and training providers (also featured in the paper this week) are doomed to fail.
The lowdown on new rules for insolvency, plus level 3 and below changes, explained by Anne Milton
I thought it would be helpful to highlight two important areas that colleges and further education providers should be aware of.
Firstly, I know that every college principal, finance director and governor will already be aware by now that new insolvency legislation came into force on January 31, and also that arrangements for exceptional financial support and the restructuring facility have come to an end.
I will keep banging the drum for the FE sector because you are all doing amazing work helping people of all ages and backgrounds to progress and get the skills they need to get great jobs. I am very aware that finances are challenging, and it is possible that some colleges will find themselves with more serious problems. The earlier we know about a problem, the more likely it is that we can help. Therefore, colleges should talk to their ESFA territorial team contact as soon as possible, to get the support that is needed.
We recognise that the introduction of insolvency is a big change, so we have developed a new “one-stop” policy document – College Oversight: Support and Intervention Policy
This sets out how we will work with colleges to identify issues early on, before they become serious, to make sure colleges are aware of the support available from the ESFA and FE Commissioner, and, where problems persist, outline how we will intervene. In extreme cases it details how the insolvency regime will work in practice. So I urge you all, if you have not already done so, please take a look!
The second thing I want to mention is our review of qualifications at level 3 and below. We have made great progress to improve the quality of technical education and training. We will be starting to roll out new T-levels from September next year and have worked with leading firms to create new high-quality apprenticeships standards.
I will keep banging the drum for the FE sector
Alongside A -levels, T-levels and apprenticeships will be the gold standard choice for students after they complete their GCSEs, but if a student chooses another qualification at level 3 or below, we want to make sure they are equally high-quality.
The current system at level 3 and below is complex and confusing, with over 12,000 courses available, often with multiple qualifications in the same subject areas. At the moment, if a young person wants to study history or geography after GCSEs, they know they can take an A-level, which is understood and trusted by parents, universities and employers.
But if a student wants to study an engineering qualification after GCSEs, there are over 200 options to choose from. It’s very hard for young people to know which will give them the best chance of getting the skills they need and for employers to know which qualifications they should be looking for.
We know that many of these qualifications are well recognised and valued; however, there are also many that we have been told offer little value to students or employers.
To help streamline and boost the quality of education, earlier this month, we launched the first of a two-part consultation reviewing qualifications at level 3 and below – excluding A-levels and GCSEs. The aim of the review is to make sure that every single qualification is high quality, necessary and has a clear purpose.
It’s clear a ‘one size fits all’ approach is not going to work. We want to take the time to get these changes right and listen carefully to everyone’s views. We are consulting in two stages – firstly, we are looking at the principles that should guide the review, before moving to publish detailed proposals for change in the second-stage consultation later this year.
Please take part in the consultation. Your views are really important and will help make sure we get these changes right.
The country’s national statistics regulator is investigating whether the Education and Skills Funding Agency’s apprenticeship achievement rate data can be trusted.
Last Thursday the national achievement rate tables published for 2017/18 came with a list of more than 30 apprenticeship providers with “unreliable” data that have been included in the headline figures.
The ESFA says the unreliable data is included to “provide a complete view of performance” and acknowledges that by doing so this year’s rate is 1.5 per cent lower than it would be if it was excluded.
“If we had excluded them for apprenticeships, then the national rate would be 68.8 per cent which would be 1.5 per cent higher than the published figure,” its report, published alongside the tables, said.
After FE Week shared the finding with the UK Statistics Authority, which had previously pressured the DfE into changing the way it presents its achievement data for 2015/16, the authority said it would look at the matter further.
The government’s achievement rate data must comply with the UK Statistic Authority’s “code of practice”, which says official statistics must ensure they are “worthy of trust”.
“The code ensures that the statistics published by government serve the public,” according to the authority’s website.
“When producers of official statistics comply with the code, it gives users of statistics and citizens confidence that published government statistics are of public value, are high quality and are produced by people and organisations that are worthy of trust.”
FE Week analysis of the national achievement rate tables for 2017/18 shows there were 23,940 apprenticeships across 34 providers that have unreliable data, including at two large high-profile colleges.
The total combined cohort for all providers in 2017/18 was 412,190, which means data for 5.8 per cent of the apprenticeships in that year cannot be trusted.
FE Week took a look back at the achievement rate data for 2016/17 and found that the DfE also included the unreliable data in the headline rate in that year. “If we had excluded them for apprenticeships, then the national rate would be 68.6 per cent, which would be 0.9 per cent higher than the published figure,” it said at the time.
In 2016/17 there were 10,610 apprenticeships across 21 providers that were redacted for having unreliable data, which was 2.5 per cent of the 409,020 total cohort.
The largest provider to be excluded for having unreliable data in 2017/18 was the troubled West Nottinghamshire College, which had an apprenticeship cohort of 4,900.
The college ran into financial difficulties last year that has led to substantial government bailouts, a high number of job losses, and, ultimately, the resignation of its longstanding, high-profile principal, Dame Asha Khemka.
Commenting on its unreliable data, a West Notts spokesperson said: “The college discovered some inaccuracies in its apprenticeship data for 2017/18, primarily in relation to directly delivered apprentices, who had been incorrectly rolled-over from the previous year.
“This was identified as part of an internal review of our data and was subsequently reported to the ESFA. We are currently working with the agency to resolve these issues.”
The other high-profile provider to be excluded from the DfE’s official achievement rate data for 2017/18 was grade one Dudley College.
The college discovered some inaccuracies in its apprenticeship data for 2017/18
Its chief executive Lowell Williams last week apologised after FE Week reported how an audit exposed dodgy data with regards to late withdrawals that resulted in more than £500,000 being paid back to the government.
It is understood that the exclusion of some of the providers from the official data this year is a result of the ESFA’s recent mystery audits.
As previously reported by FE Week, this major review of apprenticeship data is expected to result in the sector being officially warned about unacceptable data practices, as was the case nearly a decade ago when the then chief executive of the funding agency published a letter to the sector.
Asked what the sanctions are for providers who are excluded from the official data, the DfE declined to comment.
In July 2017 it came to light that the DfE was pressured into its major U-turn on the publication of hidden achievement rate data.
The department released 2015/16 national achievement rate tables for individual providers in June 2017, a few months after it closed several “loopholes”, causing significant achievement-rate drops.
However, it refused at first to provide comparable figures for previous years, prompting many in the sector to accuse it of a cover-up.
A letter written by Ed Humpherson, the director-general for regulation at the UK Statistics Authority, later revealed that his team effectively leaned on the DfE, apparently after reading FE Week’s reports on the scandal, before it finally agreed to publish the figures on July 27.
The Education and Skills Funding Agency has finally returned £300,000 to a large high-profile employer within hours of FE Week asking for an explanation.
The employer, that did not wish to be named, saw the money mysteriously disappear from their apprenticeship levy pot in November without warning or reason.
After reporting the missing funds to the ESFA, the National Apprenticeship Service replied via email that they “have been able to raise this issue to our technical team”. It added: “I hope this issue is resolved for you soon.”
In future, we hope incidents like this can be resolved far more quickly
The employer then received weekly helpdesk emails – a total of 15 so far – including updates such as: “Thank you for your patience whilst our second line support team investigate this. We are looking into your incident with great detail and will be in touch within five working days to provide another update.”
In February this year, the employer was told: “The technical support team have stated that they are conducting a full analysis to rectify your account, and other employers who have been affected by the same issue.”
When asked to escalate the issue, the agency said this was already being dealt with at the highest levels.
However, the employer had not been given a reason to why the money, which represents nearly all its levy budget for a year, disappeared from its accounts.
The business told FE Week: “Nobody seems able or willing to explain why we’ve lost £300,000 from our levy account, more than four months since it disappeared. It is also clear we are not the only employers that this has happened to. It is incredibly frustrating and we would like it returned as soon as possible.”
The employer received an email in February from the ESFA’s digital service saying that whilst the incident remains unresolved, when the levy runs out in its account it should tell its providers that they will not be chased by the ESFA for collection of the co-investment.
“During the call you have mentioned that some of your training providers have not received payments because of the amount that is missing from your account and I explained that this issue was affecting multiple employer accounts and that a fix is being applied to the affected account since December 2018.
“I have notified the Technical Support Team of the fact that you have been unable to pay for apprenticeships and have asked if they are able to try and prioritise your account when applying the fixes to the affected accounts… I hope you can forward this information to your training providers”, reads the email.
The company said that as well as hoping to see the money back into its accounts soon, it wants to know how its providers will get paid the coinvestment and what impact this will have on the sun-setting policy which kicks in next month.
An ESFA member of staff said in a FE Connect post where FE Week raised the issue: “We are working with affected employers to address the issue on an individual basis.”
FE Week asked for an explanation from the Department for Education, with permission from the employer, and within eight hours the £300,000 had returned to the employers levy account.
A spokesperson for the employer said: “Of course we are pleased that the £300,000 has now been returned to our account following enquires to the DfE from FE Week and look forward to an explanation from the ESFA. In future, we hope incidents like this can be resolved far more quickly.”
A Department for Education spokesperson told FE Week: “We are aware of the issue that impacted the employer and can confirm that this has been fully resolved, and we have confirmed to them no funds have been lost.
“The ESFA has sought to ensure this issue has been resolved and we continue to work with all employers to ensure the service delivers to the highest standards. We apologise for any inconvenience this has caused.”
It remains unclear whether the situation has been resolved for other employers affected.
The Greater London Authority has denied that devolution of the adult education budget is at risk due to spiralling IT costs, despite warning the Mayor that failure to find the extra cash could “jeopardise” the project.
The GLA is due to take control of London’s £306 million adult education budget from the Education and Skills Funding Agency on August 1, 2019.
But according to the papers to be discussed by both the mayor, Sadiq Khan, and deputy mayor, Jules Pipe, at next Wednesday’s AEB board meeting, the risk rating for the programme has moved from green to amber for the first time.
“There is a risk,” the paper reads, “the GLA doesn’t meet the projected overspend costs from other budgets, thus jeopardising the programme”.
A prime culprit for the spiralling costs is the AEB Programme Data and Contract Management Systems being built into the functionality of an existing software system known as the GLA Open Project System (OPS).
The GLA will ask the board at next week’s meeting to endorse the assembly spending a further £441,000 on system development between now and the end of July, with a doubling of the monthly expenditure.
A review in February had already increased the amount of money being put into developing systems for the AEB programme, from an average of £54,000 per month to £105,000 per month, to ensure that the work was done by August.
There is a risk the GLA doesn’t meet projected overspend costs, thus jeopardising the programme
Asked why this work had been left so late, the GLA claimed that critical elements required by the launch date are in the final phase of user testing and that contingency plans were in place which could be implemented if there are any delays with the system.
This means the GLA could still be developing the AEB systems days before it is meant to take control of the whole apparatus for the capital.
The request for additional funding is dependent on agreement by the board, followed by the GLA’s formal decisionmaking process, which the GLA told FE Week was “a formality”. Asked what would happen if it was not approved, the GLA said this was “not a realistic prospect”.
“It is standard practice for risk registers to consider a range of scenarios, however unlikely. The risk that we will not meet the projected increase in costs is not realistic because covering these costs is entirely at the Mayor’s discretion and within our capacity.” said a spokesperson.
In addition to the additional IT costs, the overall cost of management and administration appears to have rocketed 50 per cent to £4.6m.
FE Week reported in May 2018 that Sadiq Khan planned to top-slice £3 million from the AEB to pay for around 70 staff to distribute AEB funding.
However, the agenda for Wednesday’s minutes lists management and administration costs for 2019/20 year as £4.6 million.
The GLA justified the top-slice from the AEB budget on the basis that the DfE has provided no operational funds, but refused to be drawn on why this has already grown to a predicted £4.6 million for the 12 months between August 2019 and July 2020, or the impact on staffing numbers.
