The sector has watched provider after provider collapse under a crushing ‘inadequate’ Ofsted grade and DfE contract termination. Each time, we blame poor leadership or funding cuts. As a former internal quality assurer (IQA) at a recently liquidated provider, I suspect the root cause lies deeper: a flawed organisational design. Research shows that when structure does not match strategy, it can lead to fragmented execution. Essentially if a provider’s structure is not aligned with its strategy, it is doomed to fail from the start. The typical response to standardising quality is to centralise control structurally. Quite often, this takes the form of a rigid functional hierarchy where quality and delivery form isolated pillars. In theory, this creates a clear chain of command and uniform compliance. In practice, it risks a fatal disconnect. Leaders rely on vertical reporting lines rather than the ‘seams’ between departments. Research warns that having strict functional silos in the ‘middle line’ prevents horizontal communication. For quality, this blocks effective and prompt distribution of pedagogical best practices, which is fatal for standardisation. When interacting with frontline staff from an isolated quality department, the relationship can feel artificial. Quality ceases to be collaborative, real-time coaching and instead devolves into an external, retrospective policing exercise. This structural divide precipitates a toxic, defensive environment. It exemplifies Goodhart’s Law: when a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure. By treating quality as a separate compliance metric rather than an integrated teaching practice, providers reduce the complex art of education into a checklist exercise. A ‘tick-box management’ approach becomes necessary to survive top-down scrutiny, and tutors are pressured to prioritise administrative paperwork over actual learner development. This risks deskilling, high turnover or worse. In 2018, an investigation into 3aaa found that achievement rates had been artificially inflated by over 20 percentage points through manipulation of learner records. Crucially, evidence emerged that colleagues were aware of and attempted to correct the changes, only to find them reversed. The structure made honest internal upward challenging impossible and led to 3aaa’s collapse, after its £16.5 million government contracts were terminated. A structural problem cannot be effectively fixed using superficial cultural interventions. Surviving the rigorous demands of regulatory frameworks requires us to dismantle these isolated pillars. Training providers should advocate for a shift towards agile, cross-functional delivery pods under a matrix structure which creates formal reporting lines across two dimensions simultaneously – quality expertise and operational delivery. By embedding dedicated IQAs directly within respective delivery teams, the quality team are no longer external auditors ‘policing’ teaching practices, but rather collaborative partners working towards the shared goal of providing high-quality education. Functionally, IQAs retain a strict reporting line to a centralised, independent quality department, which handles summative audits and external regulatory reporting. This creates a dual reporting line: vertically to quality and horizontally to delivery. This allows IQAs to retain the objectivity to challenge poor practice sitting within a delivery team and preserve professional independence. Quality owns the standards, and delivery owns the relationship. As a result, information pathways are shortened and standardised best practices are shared promptly. Importantly, it mitigates the need for tick-box management with proactive, real-time coaching that functional silos prevent. A matrix structure does carry risks: dual reporting lines can blur authority, embedded IQAs may feel pressure to soften findings and coordinating standards across multiple pods demands stronger oversight. However, the alternative is worse. In functional hierarchies intervention often arrives too late, as demonstrated by 3aaa and other similar cases. The risks of coordination do not outweigh the certainty of failure ingrained within the status quo. This approach ensures delivery has innovative freedom and quality retains its independence, whilst preventing the ‘policing’ dynamic that undermines both. We need to stop treating quality as a separate entity by dismantling these silos and instead building structures that constructively support the individuals delivering education.
Anon 23 April 2026 A similar lack of cross fertilisation occurs in the design and operation of funding mechanisms too. Which also adversely affects providers and quality improvement. Funding models invariably include some sort of achievement or completion payment. Many think these exist as some sort of incentive to motivate providers to maximise achievement, others that funders want to avoid funding exam / EPA fees for withdrawals. Either or both may be true, but this is a distraction. Given that awarding body costs rarely exceed the achievement / completion payment percentage & funding bands or rate methodologies don’t factor in the achievement rate at the time of the funding rate decision, this actually means that withdrawals are structurally underfunded (i.e. for withdrawals, providers earn proportionately less of the available funding than the costs they avoid as a result of the withdrawal). As 100% achievement rate is a rarity in a people based system, this actually translates to overall structural underfunding. I like to think of it as a stick that has been painted orange. To the casual observer it can look like a carrot, but it’s not a high quality ingredient with much nutritional value.